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JAMIS JOHNSON 
Ct. of Appeals No. 20041122 
Appellant, Jamis M. Johnson ("Mr. Johnson"), appearing pro se, respectfully files 
his Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
Summary Judgment below declaring that Mr. Johnson has no partnership interest with 
Appellee Orvis should be vacated for the reasons that i) the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
was misapplied by the district court; ii) summary judgment is precluded as a matter of law 
because a) there remain genuine issues of material fact, b) the facts were not viewed in 
the light most favorable to Appellant; c) the district court improperly weighed credibility; 
and iii) the district court improperly manifested biasjigjrinst Appellant. 
Dated this day of October, 2005. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS vi 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED vi 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE vii 
V. FACTS ix 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT xv 
VU. ARGUMENT 1 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SBA QUOTE 1 
A. The central factual Issue here is the meaning and interpretation of 
an answer by Mr. Johnson to a question posed in an SBA deposition. 
II. MANIFEST ERROR 4 
III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 5 
A. The district court manifestly erred by improperly applying the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss appellant's cause of action when 
the elements of the doctrine were not met or satisfied. 
B. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for judicial 
estoppel; Mr. Orvis did not rely on any statement made by Mr. 
Johnson during his SBA deposition. 
C. The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the same 
and so the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
D. The subject matter of the prior case is different from the subject 
matter of the present case and so judicial estoppel is not applicable. 
E. The prior position must be ''successfully maintained" for judicial 
estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no position 
ii 
maintained. 
IV. IMPROPER GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 
A. The Court improperly disregarded established standards for 
granting summary judgment in that i) genuine material issues of fact 
existed precluding summary judgment ii) the Court failed to view the 
facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, and iii) The court 
improperly weighed credibility. 
B. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because a 
genuine and disputed material issue of fact existed precluding 
summary judgment. 
C. The district court erred by adopting the most extreme view possible 
against Mr. Johnson, of the facts of the case, rather than viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Johnson as required in 
considering summary judgment. 
D. The district court improperly weighed the credibility of the parties. 
V. JUDICIAL BIAS 24 
A. The district court manifested extreme bias against Appellant 
Johnson that resulted in the district court ignoring accepted judicial 
standards for granting summary judgment and instead the court based 
its ruling on that bias. 
VI. ORVIS-JOHNSON PARTNERSHIP 33 
A. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented, and 
the district court should be required to require and accounting of the 
partnership immediately. 
IX. CONCLUSION 34 
X. ADDENDUM INCLUDED AS EXTRA VOLUME 
iii 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
1. 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 1082 
(Utah App. 2005) 
Pages: 24, 38 
2. Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005) 
Pages: 36, 41 
3. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) 
Page: 42 
4. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996) 
Pages: 33, 37 
5. Mary J. Bailey Adams v. Spencer Adams, 1990.UT.213, 798 P.2d 1142, 143 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (Ut Appeal 09/19/90) 
Page: 23 
6. Masters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.175, 777 P.2d 499, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 
1989) 
Pages: 24, 34, 35 
7. Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74,1115, 34 P.3d 180, 187 
Page: 24 
8. Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971) 
Pages: 24, 34, 35, 36 
9. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996) 
Page: 24 
10. Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004) 
Page: 37 
11. Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004) 
Page: 37 
12. Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208,1999 UT 49, 369 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1999) 
Pages: 33, 54 
IV 
13. State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998) 
Page: 43 
14. Tanner v. Carter, 20 P.3d 332, 2001 UT 18 (Utah 02/23/2001) 
Page: 33 
15. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515,132 P.2d 388, 
390 (Utah 1942) 
Pages: 23, 24, 25 
16. Walter v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
Page: 33 
17. Winegar v. Froerer et. al., 1991.UT.110, 813 P.2d 104,161 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah 
1991) 
Pages: 40, 42 
v 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j); and Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue No. 1: Did the district court improperly apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel to 
the facts of the case, more particularly, to the interpretation of the 
SBA deposition quote of Mr. Johnson, by failing to make any 
determination with respect to the legal elements of judicial estoppel, 
to wit: Reliance, Party or Privy, Same Subject Matter., Successfully 
Maintained Position in the Prior Case, and Existence of Bad Faith 
rather than Inadvertence. 
This issue was preserved below. (Record p. 2262) 
Issue No. 2: Did the district court improperly grant summary judgment against Appellant 
Johnson when: 
i) there existed hotly contested, genuine issues of material fact 
precluding summary judgment—namely the interpretation of the 
SBA deposition quote of Mr. Johnson; 
ii) facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment; and the district court adopted the 
most extreme view of the facts against Appellant; 
iii) it is improper to weigh credibility or evidence in deciding 
a motion for summary judgment. 
This issue was preserved below. (Record p. 2258) 
Issue No. 3: Did the district court judge demonstrate actual bias against Appellant 
Johnson resulting in prejudicial error requiring reversal. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
The primary litigation involves the ownership of a partnership in a highly 
profitable business. Appellee Orvis sued for a declaratory judgment declaring he did not 
have a partnership with Appellant Johnson. Appellant Johnson counterclaimed for his 
partnership interest and for an accounting of the partnership. This matter is before the 
Court of Appeals on Third District Court Judge, Tim Hanson's grant of summary 
judgment to Appellee Orvis declaring that Appellant Johnson is not a partner with 
Appellee Orvis. This ruling is based on a statement Mr. Johnson made in a deposition in a 
separate case before the SBA. Appellant is alleged to have said that he does not have a 
partnership with Appellee Orvis. The district court held that Appellant was "judicially 
estopped" from asserting a partnership with Appellee because of the SBA statement. 
Appellant appeals that summary judgment here on the basis that the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel is inapplicable; that summary judgment is precluded because of the existence of 
genuine material issues of fact, the failure to view the facts in a light most favorable to 
Appellant, and for improper weighing of credibility; and for judicial bias against 
Appellant. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE: 
8-28-2001: Plaintiff and Appellee Jayson Orvis filed a Complaint in Third District Court 
against Defendant and Appellant Jamis Johnson. 
11-05-2001: Appellant-Defendant Johnson counterclaimed and named also as Third 
Party Defendants Victor Lawrence, Deon Steckling, and Sam Spendlove. 
11-05-2001: DaNell Johnson, wife of Appellant Johnson, was brought in and joined as a 
Third Party Plaintiff and counterclaimant against Appellee Orvis and the Third Party 
Defendants, Lawrence, et. al. 
8-30-02: Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove moved for summary judgment to obtain 
dismissal from the case which was granted by the district court, and an order was 
executed 4-18-2003. 
4-02-2004: Appellee Orvis moves for Summary Judgment against Appellant. 
The district court granted Appellee Orvis' motion entering summary judgment by Minute 
Entry on 10-20-2004, and executes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an 
Order prepared by Appellee's counsel, on 11-23-2004. 
12-21-2004: Appellant timely files a Notice of Appeal. 
2-18-2005: Appellant files a Motion For Summary Disposition, which is responded to by 
Appellee and denied by the Court of Appeal in preference for the full briefing of this 
matter. 
FACTS 
1. Brief Outline of Factual and Procedural History 
1. Appellee Orvis (Plaintiff below) and Appellant Johnson (and wife DaNell) 
have a partnership extending back to 1994 and dividing profit share on a group of credit 
repair businesses ("Orvis-Johnson partnership"). 
2. The partnership is extensively documented and evidenced by written 
agreements, a multi year course of performance dividing profit share, financial records, 
and numerous witnesses. An extensive listing of the partnership documents between the 
Johnson's and Orvis was set out in Appellant Johnson's Verified Memorandum in 
Support of Motion For Summary Disposition (Summ. Disp. Mem.). (Addendum Ex. 1, 
Summ. Disp. Mem., Ex. 10, page 3 and exhibits attached thereto.) 
3. The Orvis-Johnson partnership businesses grew to be extremely profitable now 
involving millions of dollars, and with Orvis now taking an estimated monthly profit of 
$800,000 personally or in excess of $10 Million annually. (Record p. 2243) 
4. Appellant Johnson asserts that Appellee Orvis first began embezzling and 
misappropriating partnership profit share as early as 1997. (Record p. 2247) Discovery 
to date, particularly deposition testimony of Appellee employees, confirm this. See the 
deposition testimony of Will Vigil (Record p. 2285-2288); See the deposition testimony 
of Tommy Triplett (Record p. 855-875); and see the deposition testimony of Jade Griffen. 
(Record p. 877-884) 
5. Appellant Johnson had an SB A judgment against him stemming from a personal 
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guarantee on a business that failed in the late 80s. ("SBA Judgment"). (Record p. 2247) 
Over several years, Appellant was deposed by the SBA in post judgment proceedings, as 
was Appellant's wife, DaNell Johnson, who was not a judgment debtor of the SBA. 
(Record p. 2249) 
6. Attorney Victor Lawrence represented DaNell Johnson before the SBA (Record 
p. 2390) and in numerous other matters; Attorney Victor Lawrence represented Jamis 
Johnson before the SBA and in numerous other matters. Attorney Victor Lawrence was 
engaged to work for the Orvis-Johnson business and eventually was placed as directing 
attorney for Lexington Law Firm; Attorney Victor Lawrence represented the Johnsons 
with regard to the Orvis-Johnson partnership. (Record p. 2246) 
7. In July 2001, Appellant Johnson, suspecting his partner Orvis of fraud and 
possible embezzlement, made demand on Appellee for an accounting and an audit. 
(Record p. 2256) 
8. Appellee Orvis immediately consulted with attorney Victor Lawrence and 
together they conspired to obtain the SBA judgment using funs from the Orvis-Johnson 
partnership, in order to prevent Appellant from obtaining an audit and to attempt to 
extinguish Johnson's profit share and to convert Johnsons' profit share money for 
themselves. (Record p. 2256) 
9. Within days of the Appellant Johnson's demand for an accounting, in August 
2001, Appellee Orvis acquired the SBA judgment in his name. He used funds 
misappropriated from the Orvis-Johnson partnership; Appellee Orvis purchased the SBA 
x 
judgment against Appellant to use offensively to mask the preceding fraud, to attempt to 
extinguish the partnership and to seize profit share distribution; and upon acquiring the 
SBA judgment withheld and converted the profit share that had hitherto been distributed 
to the Johnsons. (Record p. 2256) 
10. The SBA judgment was purchased with the counsel and participation of Victor 
Lawrence, attorney for DaNell Johnson and for Appellant, in the SBA case, and 
numerous other personal matters, and in business affairs of the partnership. (Record p. 
2246, Triplett Deposition; Record p. 2390) 
11. These actions by Lawrence and Orvis are in breach of attorney fiduciary duty 
and partner fiduciary duty (Record p. 2243); the object of this conspiracy by Lawrence 
and Orvis was to take the profit share owed to the Johnsons, which at this date would 
exceed $1.5 Million (based on the last six months of actual profit share) and is closer to 
$5 Million based on amounts concealed and converted by Mr. Orvis; Mr. Orvis and Mr. 
Lawrence profited by these acts by converting Appellant profit share and dividing it 
between themselves. (Record p. 2257) 
12. In August 2001, after Appellant's demand for accounting, and in concert with 
his purchase of the SBA judgment, Appellant Orvis brought this suit in Third District 
Court against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant had no partnership 
with Appellee or alternatively such interest was limited to 25% of two specific 
businesses. Appellee Orvis claimed hat all monies distributed for several years under a 
formula between Orvis and Johnsons, and for which Orvis had been providing 
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accountings monthly—all such monies were actually a "gift" from Orvis to the Johnsons. 
(Record p. 5) 
13. Appellant counterclaimed for an accounting and for profits; DaNell Johnson 
was joined as a Third Party Plaintiff, and Victor Lawrence and others as Third Party 
Defendants. (Record p. 20) 
14. On March 29, 2004 Appellee Orvis moved for summary judgment. (Record p. 
1949) Therein Appellee asserted that Appellant was judicially estopped from asserting a 
partnership interest with Appellee Orvis; this estoppel was based of an Orvis' 
interpretation of a response by Appellant in a deposition taken by the SBA in an unrelated 
prior case between the SBA and Appellant. Appellee Orvis asserted that Johnson 
responded to the SBA that he did not have partnerships. (It is the judgment in this SBA 
case that was purchased by Appellee.) (Record p. 1228) 
15. Appellant opposed the summary judgment motion. (Record p. 2242) 
Appellant asserted that i.) the quote was misconstrued, but was irrelevant regardless under 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and ii.) the doctrine of judicial estoppel, to be operative 
here, requires that the prior (SBA) action and this present action be between the same 
parties; the prior action involve the same issues as this action; the prior action be 
"successfully maintained"; and that Appellee must have detrimentally relied on the 
statement in the SBA deposition. Appellant argued that Appellee met none of the 
requirements for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to be applicable in this case. 
16. The court heard oral argument on August 9, 2004. (Record p. 2607) 
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17. In its minute entry of October 20, 2004, the Court granted summary judgment 
to Appellee, stating ".. .there was no question of mistake, Johnson testified as he did [in 
the prior unrelated SBA deposition] so as to avoid collection efforts from the Small 
Business Administration." [Emphasis added]; the court found that Appellant Johnson 
should be judicially estopped in this case from asserting a partnership based on the 
contested SBA deposition statement; and the court granted summary judgment to 
Appellee Orvis. (Record p. 2619) 
18. Appellee drafted a Judgment and a Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
which were executed by the district court on October 20, 2004. That findings of fact were 
entered is evidence alone of improper weighing of facts as opposed to issues of law which 
is the only consideration for granting summary judgment. (Record p. 2623) 
19. These facts do not reflect how broad ranging this assault on the Johnson by 
Orvis is. The following are documented in other of the numerous cases Orvis has filed 
against the Johnsons: Orvis has boasted that he would take Appellant's profit share 
money and would use it to overwhelm him with litigation. (Record p. 2334) Orvis has 
sued Johnson in five cases, four of which are currently pending. They are cases before 
Judge Bruce Jenkins in federal court, before Judge Medley in Third District Court, here 
before Judge Hanson, and before Judge McCleve in Third District Court—and this last 
suit now filed seeking to take the Johnson home based on the SBA judgment he acquired. 
Johnson's are struggling to resist this assault and do so largely without counsel. Orvis 
has arrogantly sent Johnson mocking documents telling Johnson he has lost everything. 
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(Record p. 2507) Orvis has hired private investigators to surveil Johnson, and even his 
minor children, photographing his home (Medley case #20041040); Orvis has approached 
the State Bar to prevent reinstatement. (Jenkins case #295-CV-838J) Orvis and 
Lawrence have communicated with business contacts of Johnson having them pass on 
threats to Johnsons regarding efforts by Orvis to bring criminal charges of unspecified 
sorts against DaNell Johnson unless Appellant dismisses this claim (Jenkins case #295-
CV-838J, Motion to Compel); Lawrence has been seeking other judgments against 
Johnson for himself and Orvis; Orvis is fraudulently transferring all funds he is receiving, 
in anticipation of these lawsuits, as Johnsons have been informed by Orvis contacts; Orvis 
used a sham dissolved LLC to conceal his identity when he sought judgments against 
Johnson (Record p. 2256); Orvis is operating Lexington law firm as his alter ego, and has 
been sued now, with Lawrence, in federal court in Connecticut (Record p. 2634), in a 
class action, etc. This sheer maliciousness is overwhelming. Mr. Orvis has unlimited 
resources to oppress the Johnsons. Appellant is without counsel because of the cost, 
having expended over $100,000 in this Orvis litigation thus far. Appellant is also legally 
blind with a degenerative eye disease and now deals with the added burden of multiple 
Orvis lawsuits. Orvis knows Appellant's condition and that has multiplied the paperwork 
involved. The appeal before this the Court of Appeals is the only recourse that can be 
unaffected by the financial club wielded by Mr. Orvis. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SBA QUOTE 
A. The central factual Issue here is the meaning and interpretation of an answer by 
Mr. Johnson to a question posed in an SBA deposition. 
II. MANIFEST ERROR 
III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
A. The district court manifestly erred by improperly applying the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to dismiss appellant's cause of action when the elements of the 
doctrine were not met or satisfied. 
B. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for judicial estoppel; Mr. 
Orvis did not rely on any statement made by Mr. Johnson during his SBA 
deposition. 
C. The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the same and so the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
D. The subject matter of the prior case is different from the subject matter of the 
present case and so judicial estoppel is not applicable. 
E. The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for judicial estoppel to 
apply, and in the SBA case there was no position maintained. 
IV. IMPROPER GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Court improperly disregarded established standards for granting summary 
judgment in that i) genuine material issues of fact existed precluding summary 
judgment ii) the Court failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellant, and iii) The court improperly weighed credibility. 
B. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine and 
XV 
disputed material issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment. 
C. The district court erred by adopting the most extreme view possible against Mr. 
Johnson, of the facts of the case, rather than viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Johnson as required in considering summary judgment. 
D. The district court improperly weighed the credibility of the parties. 
V. JUDICIAL BIAS 
A. The district court manifested extreme bias against Appellant Johnson that 
resulted in the district court ignoring accepted judicial standards for granting 
summary judgment and instead the court based its ruling on that bias. 
VI. ORVIS-JOHNSON PARTNERSHIP 
A. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented, and the district 
court should be required to require an accounting of the partnership immediately. 
xvi 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE SBA QUOTE 
A, The central factual Issue here is the meaning and interpretation of an answer by 
Mr, Johnson to a question posed in an SBA deposition. 
Fraud, theft of several million dollars by Mr. Orvis from the Johnsons, and an 
accounting for the partnership, are the very large and serious underlying claims here in 
this case. But those substantial claims have been summarily lost to the Johnsons because 
of a shrewd use of a small phrase in a different matter—one incredibly slight in 
comparison to the serious claims it destroys. A frail quote, purchased by a wrongdoer, 
shields the wrongdoer and allows him to keep millions and act fraudulently with 
impunity. The law does not like forfeitures. And the law favors giving litigants their day 
in court. Both these maxims are violated by posing an insubstantial issue against the large 
primary commercial litigation that ruined Appellant and his wife economically, ended 
their claims and may have shielded crimes. All because of this small and ambiguous SBA 
quote. It is therefore useful to review that SBA quote 
At issue here, raised by Mr. Orvis in his summary judgment motion below is the 
interpretation of a 52 word quote by Mr. Johnson, given in 1999 in an SBA deposition—a 
case entirely unrelated to this case. The quote in full is: 
SBA Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
Johnson A. No. I mean, you know, often Fll have a joint endeavor with somebody, but 
I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You know, if I get a deal 
I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and 
buy a lot. 
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(Record p. 1231-1232, Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 30 lines 16-25 and p. 31, lines 
1-24) 
Mr. Orvis, in his motion, sets out only one word of Mr. Johnson's answer as follows: 
Q. Do you have any partnerships ? 
A.. No. 
(Record p. 1231 line 16) 
This one word "No" lifted from the larger original quote, was presented in the 
Orvis memo to the Court as the entire and complete quote. (There is evidence that the 
Court itself did not realize that the quote was actually lengthy and that contained within 
the quote are indeed references to real property—not the Orvis enterprises—and that the 
Court believed the disingenuous Orvis excerpted "no" as the complete and full answer by 
Mr. Johnson. (Addendum Ex. 3 p. 15, line 1). Orvis, after providing the incomplete "no" 
quote as evidence, then asserted, in the memo, that "Johnson lied to the [SBA]"; and that 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel was to stop such "lying." (Record p. 1946) 
Mr. Johnson, in his opposition memorandum asserts that he understood this 
particular question to be about real estate partnerships as the actual words in his answer 
reflect; Mr. Johnson pointed out that this particular question came in a series of short 
standard questions about stocks, bonds, insurance, real estate limited partnerships, 
partnerships, etc., and came after discussion of the Orvis enterprises earlier in the 
deposition, (which would again be touched on again later in the deposition) and that Mr. 
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Johnson had discussed the Orvis enterprises in other earlier depositions, as had his wife.. 
(Record p. 2259) In short, Mr. Johnson's understanding of what the SBA was asking him 
was not about the Orvis matters. Mr. Orvis asserts that he is able to perceive how Mr. 
Johnson understood the SBA question and it was understood by Johnson to include the 
Orvis businesses 
The district court, in its decision focuses exclusively on the interpretation of this 
SBA quote. The Court adopted the Orvis interpretation and made a finding in the Minute 
Entry of November 23, 2004 that Mr. Johnson was "avoiding creditors" by this SBA 
quote, and the court interpreted this quote to mean that Mr. Johnson was responding about 
the Orvis enterprises—not about real estate partnerships as Mr. Johnson asserts. (Record 
p. 2620) 
The $30,000 Mr. Orvis paid the SBA (or rather that was paid by the sham LLC, 
All Star Financial—used initially by Orvis to conceal his identity from the SBA) got Mr. 
Orvis a pile of random material that came along with the SBA judgment. He bought the 
judgment only days before filing this lawsuit. After scouring literally thousands of pages 
in five depositions and in produced materials, the Orvis team came up with this quote— 
which he reduced to this one word "no"—which forms the basis of his sole defense to the 
partnership and fraud claims asserted against him. Some of the SBA material goes back 
10-12 years. But the $30,000 will be well worth it if Orvis may successfully use this quote 
as a total defense. But this quote that his searching eventually unearthed in this mass of 
sundry data wasn't quite what was needed. The quote must be forced into an 
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interpretative frame suitable to persuade (and inflame) the district court that these words, 
better, the single word "no" should estop and defeat Mr. Johnson and dispose of all 
matters relative to this case. 
So the disparate meanings of the SBA quote are a central focus of this brief. 
This skirmish over a minor quote in an unrelated case is, Mr. Johnson asserts, a 
sideshow, albeit a highly frustrating one, to the main event of the multimillion dollar 
struggle over the Orvis-Johnson partnership and the claims of embezzlement, fraud, and 
betrayal. Mr. Orvis pushes this minor issue to the fore because it is his only defense— 
indeed if he can distract (or inflame) the court from an inquiry into his partnership mis-
dealings, he can avoid an accounting of the partnership, an investigation into allegations 
of fraud, and a potential judgment for millions of dollars. Indeed, as this Court of 
Appeals reviews this brief, it may become clear that what Mr. Orvis gains by so 
vigorously promoting this obscure quote is to avoid a close look at activities that my be 
criminal. 
II. MANIFEST ERROR 
Manifest error is clear in this case where the evidence of the partnership is so 
overwhelming and the district court decided to ignore all of it on the basis of a "no" 
response to a vague and ambiguous question posed by the SBA in a post judgment 
deposition in an unrelated case. Manifest error exists where the lower court clearly 
misapplies the law to the facts of the case. (Mary J. Bailey Adams v. Spencer Adams, 
1990.UT.213, 798 P.2d 1142, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ut Appeal 09/19/90). The district 
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court has manifestly erred in the following ways: 
1. The district court misapplied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the facts of this case. 
Not a single of the five necessary elements are present to invoke the doctrine. 
2. The district court improperly granted summary judgment where genuine issues of fact 
exist, and in doing so the district court wrongly adopted the most extreme view of the 
facts against Appellant, rather than view those facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellant; and the district court improperly weighed the credibility of Appellant; all of 
which constitute manifest error by the lower court. 
3. Further, the district court manifested extreme bias and hostility toward 
Appellant which resulted in the district court ignoring all legal standards and ruling 
against Appellant based on the bias. 
III. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
A. The district court manifestly erred by improperly applying the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to dismiss appellant's cause of action when the elements of the 
doctrine were not met or satisfied. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well settled in Utah and its application requires 
the district court to find several separate and independent elements: 
(1) The person seeking relief, Mr. Orvis, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, must 
have "relied" on the prior deposition statement by Mr. Johnson. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 
v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). 2) The prior 
proceeding (the SBA proceeding) must be between "the same persons or their privies" as 
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the parties in this case; (3) The prior action must involve "the same subject matter" as this 
case; and (4) The prior position must have been "successfully maintained." Nebeker v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, Tf 15, 34 P.3d 180, 187; Salt Lake City v. Silver 
Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996). More recently, this Court has while 
relying on Tracy Loan and Trust Co., supra, additionally required an affirmative finding 
of bad faith and not mere inadvertence or mistake, 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C v. 
Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 1082 (Utah App. 2005). The Tracy Loan and Trust 
Co., supra statement of the elements judicial estoppel has been consistently and 
unwaveringly relied upon by this Court and the Supreme Court over the years. The 
district court simply concluded the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Mr. Johnson's 
partnership claim without analyzing the applicability of the five elements of the doctrine. 
As shown next, the district court should not have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
on the disputed facts asserted by Mr. Orvis. 
B. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for judicial estoppel; Mr. Orvis 
did not rely on any statement made by Mr. Johnson during his SBA deposition. 
As in any estoppel, the essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental 
reliance. Mr. Orvis, as his offensive strategy, tries to claim that Mr. Johnson's ambiguous 
SBA statement about "no" partnerships is a disavowal of his partnership interest with 
Orvis, but unless Mr. Orvis actually relied on that statement made to the SBA, that 
ambiguous SBA statement cannot operate to estop Mr. Johnson from asserting his 
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partnership claims. The district court ignored this reliance element altogether. In Masters 
v. Worsley, 1989.UT.175, 777 P.2d 499,112 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 1989), the 
court of appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's holding on this issue: 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshawlnv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390 
(1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial estoppel must show 
that he or she has done something or omitted to do something in reliance on the other 
party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are different 
from those upon which he or she relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel where there 
was no reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at 390-91. 
However, in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971), the court 
clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues 
actually litigated, not those which merely could have been determined. [Emphasis added.] 
The glaring error with the district court's ruling is the blatant failure by Mr. Orvis 
to establish that "he . . . has done something or omitted to do something in reliance 
on.. .[Mr. Johnson's] testimony in the earlier proceeding." Mr. Orvis has not, and cannot, 
establish the essential element of reliance thus making the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
wholly inapplicable. For this reason alone, the district court has committed manifest 
error. 
First, Mr. Orvis has never, in any way, pled or claimed reliance on the Johnson 
SBA statement—not in his motion for summary judgment, nor in his affidavit, nor in any 
other pleading. Nor is it possible to infer reliance by Mr. Orvis because there are no 
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facts, actual or alleged, anywhere in this case, from which reliance may be inferred. 
Mr. Orvis' actual actions are the antithesis of reliance. 
To have detrimentally relied or to have changed his position, Mr. Orvis must have, 
upon learning of the "no" quote in the SBA deposition essentially said to himself 
"Goodness, I must not have a partnership with Johnson. I'll change my position then from 
here on out. I'll not, over the next several years, allocate profit share to Johnsons; I'll not 
execute documents declaring the existence of the partnership; or state to others we have a 
partnership, because I have read Johnson's statement to the SBA, and though it is pretty 
darn ambiguous, I sensibly interpret that ambiguous little statement so as to end the 
partnership even though I have produced discovery documents to the SBA explaining the 
partnership, even though I have executed documents outlining the partnership and even 
though there are numerous other quotes in thousands of pages of SBA depositions that 
contradict my desired interpretation of Johnson's statement; and even though I have given 
the Johnsons, each month until I sued them, an accounting of our partnership profits— 
albeit falsified." 
Would it not seem highly unreasonable for Mr. Orvis to have, in truth, relied on 
this short ambiguous SBA statement to change the course of his multimillion dollar 
partnership? Even if Orvis could now point to some evidence of reliance, his reliance 
must still be justifiable, and reliance on this slender little quote could not be justified. 
But Orvis has never manifested reliance. He has done the opposite. 
Three years after the SBA statement, Mr. Orvis went out and bought the SBA 
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judgment (in conspiracy with Johnson's attorney Victor Lawrence). In July of 2001, Mr. 
Johnson had demanded an accounting with a CPA because the Johnsons suspected fraud. 
(Record p. 2256) Orvis, fearing that an accounting for the partnership would reveal his 
fraud, consulted with Mr. Lawrence, the Johnsons' attorney, (Record p. 2246) and these 
two conspired to acquire the SBA judgment against Mr. Johnson—the same judgment 
they had provided discovery for. Mr. Lawrence knew, from being Mr. Johnson's attorney 
and consulting with him about the SBA matter, that Mr. Johnson was negotiating to settle 
the judgment for the sum of $30,000. Exploiting that inside knowledge about their client 
and partner, Orvis and Lawrence determined to offer the SBA the same amount to buy the 
judgment but not to settle it for Mr. Johnson but to use it to destroy the partnership and 
conceal the ongoing fraud. Orvis offered Lawrence a portion of the Johnsons' profit share 
from this partnership, if they could grab it, and Lawrence's income soared at this point 
from his taking of the Johnson profit share. Thus, a few days after Mr. Johnson's demand 
for an accounting, Mr. Orvis paid the SBA for its judgment against Jamis Johnson. Mr. 
Orvis used money misappropriated from the Orvis-Johnson partnership. Mr. Orvis also 
used a dissolved sham LLC to acquire the judgment in order to conceal his identity. 
(Record p. 2256) And a few days after acquiring the judgment, Orvis filed this lawsuit 
against Johnson and summoned Jamis Johnson to a meeting at what turned out to be the 
offices of Dan Berman. Mr. Berman, at this time represented Mr. Lawrence, and Mr. 
Orvis. There, Appellant Johnson was told by Mr. Berman, with Orvis present, that Orvis 
and Lawrence had bought the SBA judgment, that Orvis had that day filed suit, and that 
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Johnson had better settle out of his partnership or the SBA judgment would be used 
against him and it would cost him $300,000 at least to fight this. Much of this is 
confirmed in the letter to Mr. Berman from Mr. Johnson. (Record p. 2515) This is hardly 
a story of detrimental reliance by an unfortunate Mr. Orvis. Appellee Orvis bought the 
SBA judgment because he knew that, indeed, he did have a partnership with Johnsons and 
he was searching for a means to avoid it. Thus, the SBA judgment was acquired by Orvis 
and Lawrence to be used against their partners and clients, and to hide Orvis' fraud. All 
further profit share distribution was taken and withheld by Orvis from the moment he 
bought the SBA judgment and filed suit, and he and Mr. Lawrence would divide this 
excess money of the Johnsons—with Lawrence's income sky-rocketing from taking his 
client's profit share. Thus while Orvis participated in producing discovery (checks, 
documents) proving to the SBA the nature of the Johnson-Orvis partnership, he would 
then surreptitiously acquire the judgment a few years later to do the opposite, to try and 
get out of the Johnson-Orvis partnership and conceal his fraud. 
Indeed, Mr. Orvis did not have to be in the position he is in now by having 
purchased the SBA judgment. He came to the SBA judgment to use it for a fraudulent 
and aggressive purpose. His very act of buying the SBA judgment is itself proof that he 
understood that he had a partnership with Johnson and was seeking an offensive weapon 
to extinguish it. This is the opposite of reliance. 
Additionally, Mr. Orvis' actions toward the SBA prevent there from being any 
reliance. Mr. Orvis did not rely nor cannot claim reliance on the SBA statement because 
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he helped Mr. Johnson outline the information to the SBA. The conclusion seems 
unavoidable that Mr. Orvis clearly understood what he was doing and was apprised of the 
SBA matter. Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence were actually part of the team that 
prepared discovery to the SBA showing the flow of profit share checks and their 
distribution. Attorney Victor Lawrence (with the knowledge of Mr. Orvis and while 
working also for Mr. Orvis) actually represented and counseled DaNell Johnson in her 
deposition by the SBA where, at his directed questioning, she laid out to the SBA the 
profit share distribution—this only months before Mr. Johnson's SBA deposition. 
(Record p. 2390) Mr. Lawrence counseled Mr. Johnson also in his depositions. Mr. 
Lawrence and Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson jointly conferred on the depositions and the 
discovery. Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence knew so much about the SBA judgment that they 
actually knew the amount Mr. Johnson was negotiating to settle this claim with the SBA 
and using that inside knowledge (gained from the attorney fiduciary relationship) they 
took advantage of it and paid the SBA exactly that amount to buy the judgment instead of 
settle it. Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence cannot (without deliberate misrepresentation) state 
that they did not understand the nature of the partnership and the profit share distribution 
or that they did not assist in establishing and outlining to the SBA an accurate picture of 
the partnership. "There is no estoppel.. .where the parties had the same knowledge of the 
facts." Again, Mr. Orvis cannot claim to detrimentally rely on the SBA statement of Mr. 
Johnson. 
After November 1999, the date of the SBA deposition, Mr. Orvis did not change 
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his position from being a partner with Mr. Johnson to a position that Mr. Johnson had no 
partnership with him. Instead Mr. Orvis did the opposite. Profit share distribution 
(distributed by Mr. Orvis) not only continued uninterrupted on a monthly basis but 
increased dramatically over the next two years up to as high as $35,000 per month just 
before Mr. Orvis filed this lawsuit; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson continued to execute and 
exchange written documents regarding the partnership, and; their active course of 
performance after the SBA statement also evidences the ongoing partnership 
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Orvis relied in any way on the 
SBA statement by Mr. Johnson. 
"There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is the controlling principal 
here. Since the district court failed to place the burden on Mr. Orvis to show his reliance; 
and there is no evidence, nor can there be evidence of reliance, the grant of summary 
judgment was clear manifest error that calls for summary reversal of the district court. 
C. The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the same and so the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
For judicial estoppel to apply, the parties in the prior case and in this case must be 
the same. The parties are not the same for three reasons: 
i.) The actual parties are not the same. 
ii.) Mr. Orvis, who claims to be a privy to the SBA because he purchased the SBA 
judgment, did so with monies misappropriated from the partnership, and he is not, 
therefore, the "privy" because the SBA judgment would actually be the property of the 
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partnership, which would be the "privy"; 
iii.) The SBA judgment was purchased in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duties 
and is void in Mr. Orvis' hands. 
The parties in the prior case were Mr. Johnson and the United States Government 
(the SBA). The parties in this current matter are Mr. Johnson, DaNell Johnson, and Mr. 
Orvis, Victor Lawrence and several others. The parties are clearly not the same. 
However, Mr. Orvis claimed, and the district court agreed, that Mr. Orvis was a privy 
with the SBA. The district court held that Mr. Orvis was in privity with the SBA since he 
purchased the SBA judgment against Mr. Johnson. The facts regarding the issue of being 
a privy are however, legitimately very much in dispute. Mr. Johnson asserts that Mr. 
Orvis was embezzling partnership money and purchased the SBA judgment using 
partnership funds wrongly taken from the partnership. If this is so, then the SBA 
judgment that he purchased would be the property not of Mr. Orvis but of the partnership. 
Accordingly, this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Mr. Orvis. Since 
this is a genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether 
the parties are the same or privies precludes summary judgment. Further, Mr. Johnson, as 
partner, charges Mr. Orvis and Mr. Victor Lawrence with fraud, conspiracy to defraud, 
breach of both partner and attorney fiduciary duties, embezzlement, theft and criminal 
conversion by taking partnership assets and purchasing the SBA judgment for the 
malicious purpose of using it to deny Mr. Johnson his profit share and his partnership 
interest and also to mask their own ongoing fraud. There is significant testimony to this 
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effect in the depositions of Tommy Triplett, (Orvis employee) (Record p. 855-875), Will 
Vigil (Lawrence and Orvis employee) (Record p. 2285-2288) and Jade Griffen, (Orvis 
employee) (Record p. 877-884). The substance of and references to these depositions 
were amply spread before the district court in the relevant pleadings. Such acts would 
void the SBA judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis, and he would not be a privy. Also 
argued in the district court, is that Mr. Victor Lawrence and Mr. Orvis manage, work for, 
and profit by Lexington law firm, Mr. Lawrence's firm. Mr. Lawrence is also the 
attorney for the Johnsons in the SBA matter and in partnership matters. It is patently 
illegal for him, and for Mr. Orvis, in conspiracy with him, to acquire a judgment against a 
client. 
This very act by both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence in buying the judgment to use 
against Mr. Johnson also voids the judgment in their hands. Please see Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom& Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 1999 UT 49, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 
1999). It may also constitute a crime. As their attorney, Victor Lawrence owed the 
Johnsons a fiduciary duty of complete loyalty and that duty means that he "must never use 
[his] position of trust to take advantage of his client's confidences for [himself] or for 
other parties." Walter v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) ["In all relationships with clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable 
honesty, fair dealing and fidelity." (emphasis added)] The court of appeal in Walter v. 
Wiley also emphasized the Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah 
App.1996) ruling and held that "[attorneys are 'not permitted to take advantage of [their] 
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position or superior knowledge to impose upon [clients]; nor to conceal facts or law, nor 
in any way deceive [clients] without being held responsible therefor/ (Emphasis added.) 
Civil conspiracy is a recognized cause of action in Utah. Tanner v. Carter, 20 
P.3d 332, 2001 UT 18 (Utah 02/23/2001). Here an attorney and a partner conspired 
against their clients for substantial gain at their clients' expense, and to hide preceding 
and ongoing fraud against them, and to extinguish and convert the Johnsons' partnership 
interest, and it may also constitute a crime. It was also fraudulent for Lawrence to 
represent DaNell Johnson before the SBA (Record p. 2390) where she explained her 
partnership with his guidance, and then for him, in this court, to repudiate that. 
These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by the 
district court in its grant of summary judgment to Mr. Orvis. And again, these issues 
would go directly to whether Mr. Orvis may claim to be a "privy" or not for purposes of 
judicial estoppel. Mr. Orvis' status as a "privy" is a material issue of fact prematurely and 
erroneously ruled on by the district court. 
D. The subject matter of the prior case is different from the 
subject matter of the present case and so judicial estoppel does not apply. 
The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency action 
brought by the SBA against Mr. Johnson. The SBA obtained a money judgment against 
Mr. Johnson. In the present action, Mr. Orvis seeks a declaratory judgment that would 
extinguish Mr. Johnson's partnership interest in their credit repair business, and Mr. 
Johnson is counterclaiming for an accounting, for conspiracy, and related claims. The 
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subject matters of the prior action and this action are clearly different. 
This distinction between the subject matter of the prior SBA case and this case is 
made clearer by a 1989 case in this Court, Masters v. Worsley, supra, wherein this Court 
stated the Utah Supreme Court had clarified the doctrine of judicial estoppel by holding 
that "the doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied 
only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have been determined." citing 
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971). The only subject 
matter litigated, and thus cognizable, in the prior SBA action were the foreclosure action 
and the guarantee contract. The specific partnership of the credit repair business in this 
case was not litigated in the prior SBA action, and so, it is not a subject matter of the SBA 
case that may be used in applying the same subject matter test. Because these SBA issues 
are different from those issues pending in this case, judicial estoppel is not applicable. It 
is reversible manifest error for the district court to have granted summary judgment 
through the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel when the subject matter here is 
different from the subject matter in the prior case. 
E. The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for judicial estoppel to 
apply, and in the SBA case there was no position maintained. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, as one of its tests of applicability, that 
the prior position be "successfully maintained". As cited above, this court in Masters v. 
Worsley, supra, citing Richards v. Hodson with approval, stated: 
...inRichards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971), the court clarified 
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that the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied 
only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been determined. 
There was no discernable action by the SBA or by Mr. Johnson, which was 
"maintained" or pursued, let alone concluded "successfully" involving the "position", i.e. 
that there was no Orvis-Johnson partnership. The requirement that a particular position 
be successfully maintained forces the "position" through the filter of adjudication. Issues 
are necessarily defined and the position is clarified, debated, and placed before a trier, and 
is either maintained successfully or not. The Richards case leaves no room for deviation. 
It is not enough under Richards that the alleged "position" Orvis strains to attribute to 
Johnson, "might have been determined". It must have been litigated. The controverted 
"position" involving the SBA quote interpretation was not litigated. It was never 
successfully maintained. This was duly and clearly argued below. The district court, in its 
haste to rule against Mr. Johnson, again ignored an essential element of judicial estoppel 
even though it was clearly and squarely argued below. The district court manifestly erred 
by applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to these facts, looking to the disputed SBA 
statement of Mr. Johnson as the basis to grant summary judgment and to declare that no 
partnership existed between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. 
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IV. IMPROPER GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Court improperly disregarded established standards for granting summary 
judgment in that i) genuine material issues of fact existed precluding summary 
judgment ii) the Court failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellant and iii) The court improperly weighed credibility. 
The district court Judge Hanson had to wholly ignore the most fundamental of 
legal standards guiding the granting of motions for summary judgment in order to award 
Orvis summary judgment. These standards are axiomatic and universal in American 
jurisprudence and are known to every lawyer and, unquestionably, to every judge. These 
standards are established to assure that litigants get their fair day in court. 
These standards are: 
1. Summary judgment is improper when there are disputed issues of material fact, 
Salt Lake County v.Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., §9 P.3d 155 (Utah 2004) . 
2. The facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the one opposing 
summary judgment, Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P. 3d 323 (Utah 
2005) . 
3. It is improper to weigh credibility in deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.1996). 
Further because the facts must be undisputed to begin, it is the trial court's view of law 
which are reviewed for correctness, Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), "In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we give no deference to the trial court with 
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respect to its legal conclusions." 
The trial court violated each of these in granting Orvis' motion. 
B. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine and 
disputed material issue of fact existed precluding summary judgment. 
The central fact ruled on by the lower court was a hotly disputed factual issue. 
Orvis strove for his version of the SB A quote based on his "no" quote, and Johnson 
asserted that he understood the question posed by the SBA to refer to real property and 
not to the already covered Orvis businesses. 
The meaning of the disputed SBA deposition quote should not have been an issue 
here at all. It occurred in an unrelated matter years before and is irrelevant as a matter of 
law as the analysis of the doctrine of judicial estoppel demonstrates. Nonetheless, this 
quote, discovered by Orvis in the materials he purchased from the SBA, was brought to 
this case by Orvis and forms the sole basis of his summary judgment motion—indeed it is 
his only defense. And the Court was willing to entertain this factual matter that ordinarily 
should have been excluded. Further, the Court's explicit finding, in his Minute Entry, 
that the prior SBA statement was not a "mistake" thus made a factual ruling on the bad 
faith/mistake requirement of judicial estoppel—a critical material issue hotly in dispute, 
3D Const, and Development, L.L.C., supra. Hence the SBA quote became the central 
issue that Johnson must dispute. And Johnson did. The Appellant, Mr. Johnson contested 
the meaning of that SBA quote all the while pointing out that it was irrelevant. 
The Orvis interpretation of the ambiguous SBA quote supporting his summary 
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judgment is that "Mr. Johnson has lied [to the SB A about his partnership interest with 
Orvis]." [Emphasis added.] (The Court's Record appears to lack this pleading - please 
see Addendum Ex. 1, Johnson's Memo in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Disposition, Ex. 6, Orvis Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 7). 
To support this, Mr. Orvis, in his memo, lifts only the single word "no" from a 
lengthy quote. Orvis' version of the quote, as stated to the judge below is "Q. Do you 
have any partnerships? A. No." (As reviewed before, the actual quote is 52 words long. 
This type of misquoting is so transparent and ethically dubious that it would seem to give 
most judges pause.) This truncated "no" quote was also consistently used by Lawrence as 
well. 
This quote is not a "lie" and Mr. Johnson understood the scope of the question and 
the response to involve real estate activities, and not to encompass the Orvis credit repair 
businesses which were discussed earlier, and also later, in this deposition and in prior 
depositions. This meaning of the SBA quote is amply explained extensively and 
repeatedly in, for example, Mr. Johnson's Memorandum opposing the Orvis Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and supporting affidavit. That the quote is not a lie is ascertained 
from the context of the answer, itself. Mr. Johnson's response, memorialized by the SBA, 
reflects a response contemplating real estate. And the SBA (which clearly knows about 
the Orvis enterprises) doesn't try to elicit anything further about the Orvis matters. 
While in this case, Orvis labels this a lie, astoundingly, Orvis' counsel took 
completely the opposite position before Judge Bruce Jenkins, U.S. District Court. Civ No. 
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295-CV-838J. These same parties and same attorneys are before Judge Bruce Jenkins in 
the U.S. District Court dealing with this very SBA deposition and the partnership issues— 
just one of five cases Orvis has brought and are pending against Johnson over this matter. 
There Orvis' counsel stated to Judge Jenkins "We do not believe that Mr. Johnson 'lied' 
to the SBA." This is the same counsel who baldly asserted the inflammatory claim before 
Judge Hanson below that Johnson "lied" to the SBA. Such sharply differing statements by 
the Orvis team on the same subject cause one to wonder who indeed of all these 
participants does lie, and who should be judicially estopped. There Judge Jenkins, who 
actually presides over this SBA case is unmoved at all about the SBA quote, and he 
roundly repudiates the Orvis theory regarding the SBA and judicial estoppel, and actually 
indicated to Orvis' counsel that it was evident that Johnsons and Orvis had a partnership 
that needed to be accounted for and undergo winding up. Appellant is obtaining a 
certified copy of the complete Jenkins transcript but it was unavailable as of the time of 
this briefs filing. (Appellant is submitting this brief in verified form equivalent to an 
affidavit in that regard.) Clearly, Orvis does not believe even his own interpretation of 
the SBA quote he puts forth to Judge Hanson. 
Mr. Johnson hotly contests the Orvis interpretation of the SBA quote. Mr. Johnson 
offered substantial and extensive support as to why this quote, deliberately taken out of 
context by Orvis, and ignoring scores of other quotes, is falsely interpreted by Orvis. The 
meaning of that single quote has consistently been disputed by Johnson at each turn and 
with extensive support. 
21 
Despite the differing interpretations, the district judge improperly ruled on this 
fact—the meaning of this quote—and entered summary judgment based on it. He 
interpreted it to indicate that Johnson was "avoiding" the SBA creditor. To be satisfied 
that Mr. Johnson was avoiding creditors, the district court was indeed accepting the 
version of the facts presented by Mr. Orvis and rejecting Mr. Johnson's version that he 
never disavowed his partnership interest in the credit repair businesses with Mr. Orvis. 
To be satisfied of one set of facts over another involves a weighing of the two sets of 
facts. This of course is not permissible, as a matter of law, on a motion for summary 
judgment. Winegar v. Froerer et aL, 1991.UT.110, 813 P.2d 104, 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 
22 (Utah 1991). Because the meaning of this quote was highly contested and there 
was ample, reasonable support for Appellant Johnson's interpretation, the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment on a disputed material factual issue—the SBA 
quotation. 
C. The district court erred by adopting the most extreme view possible against Mr. 
Johnson, of the facts of the case rather than viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Johnson as required in considering summary judgment. 
Judge Hanson adopted the most extreme view he could possibly adopt against Mr. 
Johnson in viewing the facts. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the facts 
are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the one opposing summary judgment, 
Anderson Development Co., supra. Rather than utilizing this "perspective" the Court did 
the opposite—there was not even an attempt at a middle ground here, let alone a 
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recognition that these facts must be weighed in that light most favorable toward Mr. 
Johnson. This is reflected by the Court's statement that Mr. Johnson "lied" to the SB A, 
urging Orvis to go to the U.S. Attorney. (Hearing on Motions January 29, 2003 Before 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, p. 9, included as Addendum exhibit 2) Indeed this 
outrageous reflection of the Judge's sentiment was stated by the judge at the earliest 
possible moment in the case and before the court had actually read any pleading by 
Johnson or reviewed the claims of the complaint. Further, in his Minute Entry the Judge 
states "there is "no question" here on the facts but that Johnson was "avoiding creditors" 
To make such extreme statements requires the Judge to view the facts exclusively in favor 
of Orvis. 
That view of the facts most favorable to Johnsons is that the SBA quote is 
misconstrued by Mr. Orvis, and that Mr. Johnson was responding to a series of questions 
by the SBA covering the standard list of assets, i.e., stocks, bonds, insurance, etc., and 
that Mr. Johnson presumed he was talking about real estate matters. 
Such a view would have precluded summary judgment, but the district court failed 
to take the view required by the standard required to grant summary judgment. 
The lower court is in error in this regard and his granting of summary judgment is 
improper. 
D. The district court improperly weighed the credibility of the parties. 
While it is wrong to rule on one set of facts over another in summary judgment, 
Winegar supra, since Mr. Johnson's set of facts involves the issue of his credibility, the 
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district court's rejection of his version of the facts, is a clear repudiation of his credibility 
as well. Weighing parties' credibility is also improper and it is another manifest error by 
the district court requiring this court to grant summary disposition reversing the lower 
court's grant of summary judgment. Maters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.17, 777 P.2d 499,112 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 1989). 
The trial court is extensively experienced and it would seem beyond question that 
it understands the standard for granting summary judgment in the face of disputed facts. 
Nonetheless, the trial court wholly abandoned the most fundamental of standards in 
granting summary judgment. If there is a factual dispute and weighing credibility in itself 
indicates a dispute, then summary judgment is inappropriate, Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) . That was error and it should be reversed. 
V. JUDICIAL BIAS 
A, The district court manifested extreme bias against Appellant Johnson that 
resulted in the district court ignoring accepted judicial standards for granting 
summary judgment and instead the court based its ruling on that bias. 
Appellant like any other party in any judicial proceeding in our system of justice is 
entitled to impartial justice. The district court below failed in its duty to administer justice 
in this case with any level of impartiality. Actual bias as shown on the record by the trial 
judge's remarks on the record prior to having read any of Appellant's pleadings is 
reversible error when actual prejudice results, State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 
1998) . The district court judge Hanson improperly harbored an extreme bias against 
Appellant, and abandoned judiciousness and civil procedure, and instead ruled against 
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Appellant based on that bias. This bias was sufficiently evident and pervasive that the 
lower court decision should be reversed. 
It should be noted that this judge handled Mr. Johnson's bar proceeding and this 
district judge entered the order that resulted in the order of disbarment. And indeed, that 
pending bar action played a role in Mr. Johnson's preparations in this case (such as, for 
example, Mr. Johnson's resignation as directing attorney from Lexington Law Firm 
because of the looming bar matter and his appointment of Victor Lawrence as the 
directing attorney for Lexington Law Firm—the position from which Lawrence would 
conspire with Mr. Orvis to defraud Mr. and Mrs. Johnson—his clients.) The Judge, in a 
hearing on January 29, 2003, made it evident that he was well aware of this. (See 
Addendum Ex. 2, p. 5) 
Now, in this case, Judge Hanson, in dealing with Appellant Johnson, deliberately 
ignores the most basic standards for granting summary judgment and rules against Mr. 
Johnson and gives Mr. Orvis a windfall in a multi-million dollar case—based solely on 
the judge's preconceived certainty about Mr. Johnson's character and preconceived 
certainty about the meaning of a few short words, ambiguous at best, given in an 
unrelated SBA case. This modest quote is wholly irrelevant based on the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel. And to so rule as he did, the district judge must turn a blind eye to 
allegations that are not small at all like the disputed SBA quote, but involve millions of 
dollars, and ethical considerations, and fraud; he must turn a blind eye to the alleged 
embezzlement of Mr. Orvis and the outrageous and fraudulent acts by Orvis and 
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Lawrence that, are themselves, actively fraudulent as to the Johnsons and squarely 
forbidden by Utah law. 
Weigh these relative choices on the scales of justice and ask what was in the 
district court's mind. 
On one side, there is the SBA quote. It is ambiguous at best. It is only one quote 
among scores of such statements. It is unrelated to this case. It arguably is irrelevant 
under all standards of judicial estoppel, its meaning is uncertain, and it is not the sort of 
statement that should give rise to summary judgment, though Mr. Orvis hopes it will 
entirely solve his case. The utterance by Mr. Johnson of this foggy little quote, this one 
alleged bad act, is that perceived sin upon which the district court will entirely rest its 
decision to wipe out all claims whatsoever of the Johnsons worth millions of dollars. 
On the other scale, there are claims of great wrongs, grievous acts—not the 
disputed meaning of a statement made in a routine deposition, but active and deliberately 
schemed acts of huge moment, ethically, financially, morally; on this scale is the 
undisputed fact that the Johnsons and Orvis are partners in a partnership worth millions of 
dollars, documented by much more than a single word: by 5 years of profit sharing, by 
executed documents of partnership, and by impartial witnesses; on this scale is the 
startling yet undisputed testimony of Orvis and Lawrence employees that Orvis did 
embezzle, did falsely state partnership accounts to the Johnsons, did set up secret 
companies to divert profits from the Johnsons, and did conspire with attorney Lawrence 
to violate their fiduciary duties to the Johnsons for personal gain—and it was a huge gain. 
26 
Now viewing those scales, those relative choices, this district judge decided to turn 
a blind eye to substantial and overt fraud by Orvis and Lawrence, that completely wipes 
out the Johnsons, and leaving Orvis and Lawrence with astounding profits; and instead, 
decided that a single word, taken from a 52 word quote, should be the basis to destroy any 
financial interest the Johnsons have in this long standing partnership—destroy it without 
even giving the Johnsons any chance to prove or pursue their claims—wipe them out with 
indifference to clear legal standard. It boggles the mind. 
Why would a district judge be so cavalier about justice and procedure; why would 
the district judge destroy a multimillion dollar interest on a rambling few ambiguous 
words by Mr. Johnson, and leave Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence undisturbed and protected 
from any accounting? Why would the district judge effectively choose Mr. Orvis to 
receive this huge windfall of millions of dollars, wrested through scheming from the 
Johnsons, and to receive immunity from any inquiry into the claims of embezzlement and 
conspiracy? The answer is the extreme bias of the judge. 
This bias is most clearly demonstrated by the Judge. Judge Hanson's own words 
leave no doubt about the improper, reversible bias this Judge harbors against the 
Appellant. His words demonstrate that he was either extremely hostile, or he did not care 
enough to examine any of the facts and would not seriously review the Johnson 
arguments, despite his claim to have read extensively. 
Here are some examples of Judge Hanson's statements. In the first hearing in this 
case, Judge Hanson indicated that he had fully read the Movant Lawrence's pleading. 
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(Addendum Ex. 2, p. 2) A highly inflammatory pleading that subsequent discovery 
demonstrates to be false. But the Judge had not then read the Appellant's pleading. The 
Court also indicated that he could not remember the Complaint and would have to review 
it. But despite that, the Court angrily stated that Jamis Johnson was lying to the SBA. 
The Court then asked if anyone had reported Mr. Johnson to the U.S. Attorney. 
(Addendum Ex. 2, p. 9, line 2) The Court angrily accused Mr. Johnson's wife of also 
lying to the SBA, and demanded from Johnsons' counsel if Mr. Lawrence would have 
told her to lie but that she must have done it herself. (Addendum Ex. 2, p. 16, line 20) 
(This statement regarding DaNell Johnson from the Court demonstrates that he did not 
understand the players, their roles, and the claims, but was willing to immediately decide 
that Mrs. Johnson must also be somehow lying about something, whatever that something 
might be.) DaNell Johnson was never even accused of any misstatement, and Mr. 
Lawrence had not revealed to the district court that he actually represented DaNell before 
the SBA and had bought and owned the SBA judgment. These were issues relevant to the 
ongoing hearing. But the Court waved away any discussion of Lawrence's representation 
of DaNell and clearly telegraphed that he did not care about, nor would he listen to, any 
facts about acts of the other parties. Johnson's counsel was not even allowed to get the 
words out. 
While the Court was not interested in the acts of Victor Lawrence as an attorney, 
misrepresenting DaNell Johnson, the court was highly incensed at Mr. Johnson, who it 
had previously punished. The Court said "Well, you know, I don't even care if it's a 
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fraud. Just a flat lie is bad enough for me, particularly from someone who used to be a 
lawyer." (Addendum Ex. 2, p. 19, line 2) 
The Court effectively denounced Mr. Johnson, anyone connected with him and 
anyone attempting to defend him. Mr. Johnson's counsel was interrupted, belittled, dealt 
with sarcastically, and intimidated during that unfortunate argument. (Addendum Ex. 2, 
p. 21, line 2) 
The court demanded to know why DaNell Johnson was a party (confirming that he 
had not read the complaint or the responsive brief of Johnson) and then determined that 
he would dismiss her as she had not been joined by motion. The court did this, it said, 
because there would be an appeal and things needed to be arranged properly. Thus the 
court telegraphed its intention already to rule against Mr. Johnson. The court assumed 
that he would appeal and the court wanted to make this thing stick. (Addendum Ex. 2, p. 
14, line 4 and p. 33 line 15) 
The court gave carte blanche to Lawrence and his counsel, Atkin, to draft an order, 
which they did, underscoring that Mr. Johnson "lied" to the SBA. They quoted, again, 
only the word "No" (always truncating the actual quote). The court found nothing to 
alter, despite objections to the outrageous findings in that document. 
Thereafter, in the next oral argument, Mr. Orvis' motion for summary judgment, 
counsel for Mr. Johnson described the SBA quote and its context. 
The Court demonstrated that he had not read the actual quote, or had confused it 
with another, but said that Johnson had answered only "No" when asked about 
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partnerships. (Addendum Ex. 3 p. 15, line 1) It was clear that the judge had not read 
Appellant's brief and hadn't read or understood the actual quote, but had instead decided 
to accept the severely truncated version of the quote concocted by Appellee's counsel, 
along with Appellee's interpretation of the quote. 
The judge had read Orvis' brief and had prejudicially adopted his version of the 
quote, which consequently became the quote upon which he was relying. It is clear that 
he misperceived what was actually said by Mr. Johnson to the SB A, and either didn't care 
what was actually said, or he had simply made up his mind. The Court made the 
reference that it knew Mr. Johnson had been a lawyer and this was simply the effort of a 
smart lawyer to fool the SBA, clearly implying that this court would not accept any 
interpretation by Mr. Johnson's counsel as to the SBA statement's meaning because he 
had predetermined that it was manipulated. Thereafter, in the minute entry, the district 
court goes so far as to declare that he has read extensively and there can be no "mistake" 
and that Mr. Johnson was "avoiding creditors". 
These words from this Judge reflect a long standing and deep seated bias against 
Appellant. Certainly any party to litigation feels dismayed and even unfairly treated by a 
court when he loses a hearing. This Court of Appeals will recognize that feeling among 
litigants. But here, there is something more than the dismay of a loss. Here is a judge 
who angrily, and often sarcastically, reveals that he believes ill of Appellant Johnson and 
does not intend to let him proceed fairly. It is not the dismay of a loss, it is the profound 
sense that there is one with an unaccountable enmity that stands ready to block all access 
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to even a hearing—a fundamental right offered by Utah's Constitution and it's judiciary. 
It is obvious to anyone observing all of this that Mr. Orvis purchased the SBA 
judgment to extinguish the financial claims of the Johnsons. He was quite lucky to find a 
lower court official harboring an animosity towards Mr. Johnson who would be so 
indifferent to procedure and law. 
Mr. Orvis and his counsel further tried to cultivate this bias. It is one thing to 
observe bias in a judge, and wonder how big a role it played in a particular decision. It is 
another thing, where the opposing parties zero in on that bias as a litigation strategy. 
Here, the transcripts and pleadings are shot full of references to Mr. Johnson's bar 
problems. The primary tactic of Mr. Orvis and Lawrence relies not on the law but on an 
effort to inflame a judge that is perceived to dislike Mr. Johnson. Perhaps the temptation 
for Orvis' counsel is too great in such an instance as this, not to attack a party personally 
before a hostile judge. It is wrong. It should not be rewarded. It has proven to be the 
signal technique of Mr. Orvis and his attorneys. This Court should view such activity 
dimly . 
As stated, Mr. Orvis, with his unlimited resources, is suing Mr. Johnson in 
five courts. There is pending before this Court of Appeals another Orvis-Johnson case. 
The latest case is Mr. Orvis' suit to take Mrs. Johnson's home. 
Much else has emerged of a serious nature in other of the five cases brought by 
Mr. Orvis and his same counsel—some of which is before this Court now in Ct. of App. 
20041040. 19. The following are documented in other of the numerous cases Orvis has 
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filed against the Johnsons: Orvis has boasted that he would take Appellant's profit share 
money and would use it to overwhelm him with litigation. (Record p. 2334) Orvis has 
pending the aforementioned multiple suits before Judges Medley, McCleve, and Jenkins, 
as well as here. Orvis has arrogantly sent Johnson mocking documents telling Johnson he 
has lost everything. (Record p. 2507) Orvis has hired private investigators to surveil 
Johnson, and even his minor children, photographing his home (Medley case #20041040); 
Orvis has approached the State Bar to prevent reinstatement. (Jenkins case #295-CV-
838J) Orvis and Lawrence have communicated with business contacts of Johnson having 
them pass on threats to Johnsons regarding efforts by Orvis to bring criminal charges of 
unspecified sorts against DaNell Johnson unless Appellant dismisses this claim (Jenkins 
case #295-CV-838J, Motion to Compel); Lawrence has been seeking other judgments 
against Johnson for himself and Orvis; Orvis is fraudulently transferring all funds he is 
receiving, in anticipation of these lawsuits, as Johnsons have been informed by Orvis 
contacts; Orvis used a sham dissolved LLC to conceal his identity when he sought 
judgments against Johnson (Record p. 2256); Orvis is operating Lexington law firm as his 
alter ego, and has been sued now, with Lawrence, in federal court in Connecticut (Record 
p. 2634), in a class action, etc. Mr. Orvis has unlimited resources to attack the Johnsons. 
The Johnsons are overwhelmed. 
This district judge's personal bias rises to a level that led him to improperly 
disregard the correct application of the law, and rule against the Appellant. Appellant 
prays the Court of Appeals to reverse that motion for summary judgment for undue and 
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improper bias on the part of the district judge. 
VI. ORVIS-JOHNSON PARTNERSHIP 
A. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented, and the district 
court should be required to require an accounting of the partnership immediately. 
The evidence of the Orvis-Johnson partnership is extremely well documented and 
has proceeded for many years. An extensive documentation of the partnership is set out in 
Mr. Johnson's Summary Disposition Memorandum filed with this court. There are 
hundreds of profit share checks and memos of accounting data provided by Mr. Orvis. 
The Johnson's were receiving $35,000 per month at the time Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence 
bought the SBA judgment against them and commenced withholding profit share. Mr. 
Orvis claims in his initial Complaint that all this profit share funds were "gifts" from him 
to Mr. Johnson. That of course is wildly preposterous. However, Mr. Orvis has not ever 
denied, since them, the validity of the documents of partnership that have been presented. 
Indeed, in his response to the summary Disposition motion, he did not deny the 
partnership, only that Mr. Johnson should not be allowed to claim it because of the SBA 
quote. So while the existence of the partnership is virtually irrefutable, Mr. Orvis has not 
bothered to even try to refute it. He has let pass any opportunities to deny the documents 
and affidavits below or here. (Indeed inherent in his argument that Mr. Johnson "lied" to 
the SBA about having an Orvis-Johnson partnership is the obvious fact that this would 
not be a "lie" as Mr. Orvis asserts, unless Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis do indeed have a 
partnership—else how could the SBA statement be incorrect?) Mr. Orvis' strategy was to 
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ignore the issues surrounding the existence of the partnership, and to focus below and 
here, on the SBA quote defense. He should not be allowed to deny the existence of the 
partnership because he has not done so before this. Thus, the Orvis-Johnson partnership 
is a matter of established fact—though the actual accounting therefor remains to be done. 
If the SBA quote is regarded as inapplicable by this Court of Appeals, then Mr. Johnson 
should not further have to prove the partnership below, but rather should proceed to get 
an accounting finalized for the Orvis-Johnson partnership. 
The Orvis-Johnson partnership under Utah law must have an accounting and be 
wound up. This Court of Appeals should require the district court to allow Mr. Johnson 
to commence that process one the case is returned to the district Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant Johnson asks the Court of Appeals to find as follows: 
The district court erred in finding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is properly 
invoked here to estop Appellant Johnson from asserting a partnership interest with 
Appellee Orvis. The disputed SBA quote is not a basis to estop Johnson's partnership 
claims. Judicial Estoppel requires four elements, each of which are indispensable and 
none of which have been demonstrated by Appellee Orvis. The four elements, with the 
applicable facts of this case, are: 
1. Reliance: Mr. Orvis did not detrimentally rely on his alleged understanding of 
the SBA quote, or materially change his position as to his partnership with Johnson upon 
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learning of the SBA quote. Mr. Orvis continued to treat Mr. Johnson as a partner and 
determined to buy the SBA judgment to use to defend against Johnson's claim of a 
partnership. There is no evidence of reliance. Mr. Orvis' actions are the opposite of 
reliance, and indeed, there is evidence that he may have violated his partner fiduciary duty 
and that attorney Lawrence may have violated his attorney fiduciary duty. This Court will 
not allow a partner, in conspiracy with one's attorney, to acquire a judgment against a 
partner and claim judicial estoppel. 
2. Similar Parties: The parties to the SBA litigation are not the same as the parties 
to this litigation. Even though Appellee Orvis claims to be a privy of the SBA, if he 
conspired with attorney Victor Lawrence to acquire the judgment against Appellant 
Johnson, the judgment would be void in his hands for fraud and public policy , See: 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 1999 UT 49, 369 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 36 (Utah 1999); and if he used partnership monies to acquire the judgment, he 
would not be the actual owner of the judgment, the partnership would own it. 
3. Similar Issues. The issues in the SBA case and in this instant case must be the 
same. The only issues cognizable are those issues that have been litigated in the prior 
case. In the SBA case, that would be a real estate foreclosure and a guarantee under an 
SBA note. Those issues are not the same as here. 
4. The prior position must be successfully maintained: The prior position must 
have been litigated. The disputed quote, or Appellee Orvis' interpretation of it, was not 
ever a "position" that was litigated and successfully maintained. Thus, based on the 
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doctrine of judicial estoppel and Appellee Orvis' failure to establish the applicability of 
this doctrine, it was improper for the district court to find that the doctrine was applicable 
in this case. The disputed SBA quote may not be used to estop the assertion of a 
partnership in this case. 
The district court erred further in granting summary judgment. The interpretation 
by Appellee Orvis of the SBA quote by Appellant Johnson, while arguably wholly 
irrelevant here under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, is nonetheless strongly disputed by 
Appellant Johnson who provided a reasonable alternative meaning to the SBA quote. The 
meaning of this SBA quote is a disputed genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment. The district court improperly granted summary judgment on this 
disputed material factual issue. The district court improperly adopted that perspective of 
the facts that was the least favorable to Appellant. Appellant provided a reasonable 
interpretation of the meaning of the SBA statement, however the trial Court asserted in its 
minute entry that there was "no mistake" as to this fact. The facts as asserted by 
Appellant, when viewed as he urges prevent summary judgment. The district court also 
improperly weighed the credibility of Appellant. 
The district court manifested bias against the Appellant. The fact that the district 
court handled the bar proceeding against Appellant Johnson in an earlier case, and 
appears to have manifested strong feelings toward the Appellant here is of concern. The 
district court asserted that Appellant was lying, and even accused Appellant's wife of this 
same thing. Further, Appellee and his counsel appear to have been attempting to inflame 
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this judge by their numerous personal attacks. 
The Orvis-Johnson partnership is well established and Appellant Johnson, as in 
any partnership is entitled to an accounting. Accordingly, the district court is directed tc 
proceed with an accounting of this partnership and to follow other applicable Utah 
partnership law. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court should be set aside and 
the matter returned to the lower court to order and oversee an accounting of this 
partnership and winding up if applicable, under Utah partnership law . This court shall 
also inquire into the actions of Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence relative to the claims of 
fiduciary duty raised by Appellant. 
DATED this i  day of October, 
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